MH-60R Emergency Procedures

The following should be performed for all emergencies:
1. Maintain control of the aircraft.
2. Alert crew.
3. Determine the precise nature of the problem.
4. Complete the applicable emergency procedure or take action appropriate for the problem.
5. Determine landing criteria and land as required.

Land immediately
Execute a landing without delay. The primary consideration is to ensure the survival of the occupants.

Land as soon as possible
Execute a landing at the first site at which a safe landing can be made.

Land as soon as practicable
Extended flight is not recommended. The landing site and duration of flight are at the discretion of the PIC.

12.2.1 Engine Malfunction in Flight
*1. Control Nr.
*2. CONTGCY PWR switch — ON.
*3. Single−engine conditions — Establish.
*4. ENG ANTI−ICE switches — As required.
*5. External cargo/stores/fuel — JETTISON/DUMP, as required.
*6. Identify malfunction.

WARNING:
– Flying at an airspeed greater than 105 KIAS with one engine inoperative may result in unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual−engine failure.
– With engine anti−ice on, up to 18 percent torque available is lost. Torque may be reduced as much as 49 percent with improperly operating engine inlet anti−ice valves.

12.2.2.1 Engine High−Side Failure in Flight
*1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
*2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) — Retard to set:
a. Torque 10 percent below good engine or
b. Matched Ng or
c. Matched TGT.
3. Land as soon as practicable.

CAUSE/REMARKS
CAUTION: If an Np overspeed condition is reached (120 percent), the overspeed system will flame out the engine and the autoignition system will relight the engine. If Nr is not controlled and Np accelerates back to 120 percent, the Np overspeed system will flame out the engine again and the autoignition system will reset the ignitor 5-second timer. The Np overspeed/ autoignition system will continue cycling unitl Nr/Np is controlled. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights.

NOTE: With high collective settings, Nr may increase slowly, making high-side failure confirmation difficult. Reducing collective will reveal increasing Nr and verify high-side failure.

(#1/#2 ENG SPEED HI) Illuminates when all of the following exist:
1. TRQ is 10% or greater than other engine.
2. Ng is 5% or greater than other engine.
3. Np is matched within 5% of other engine.
4. Nr is at or above 103%.

12.2.2.2 Engine High-Side Failure on Deck
*1. PCLs — IDLE.

12.2.2.3 Engine Low-Side Failure in Flight
*1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) — Momentarily advance to LOCKOUT, then retard to set:
a. Torque 10 percent below good engine or
b. Matched Ng or
c. Matched TGT.
3. Land as soon as practicable.

CAUSE/REMARKS
CAUTION: When an engine is manually controlled with the ENG POWER CONT lever in LOCKOUT, the engine response is much faster and the TGT-limiting system is inoperative. Care must be taken to prevent exceeding TGT limits and keeping Nr and Np in their operating ranges; however, the Np overspeed system will still be operative.

(ENG SPEED LO) will illuminate when all of the following conditions exist:

1. TRQ is 10% below the good
engine.
2. Ng is 5% or less than the
good engine.
3. Np is at or below 98%.
4. Nr is at or below 97%.

12.2.2.3.1 Engine Torque or TGT Spiking/Fluctuations
If an engine instrument is spiking/fluctuating and inducing secondary indications in Ng, Np, and/or Nr:
*1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
If fuel contamination is suspected:
*2. Land as soon as possible.
If engine electronic circuitry is suspected:
3. PCL (malfunctioning engine) — Momentarily advance to LOCKOUT, then retard to set:
a. Torque 10 percent below good engine or
b. Matched Ng or
c. Matched TGT.
If fluctuations persist:
4. PCL (engine in LOCKOUT) — Retard to IDLE, then return to FLY.
5. Repeat steps 3. and 4. for the other engine, as required.
If an engine instrument is spiking/fluctuating with no secondary indications:
6. Land as soon as practicable.

WARNING: PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure. Consider performing APU Emergency Start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL. Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails.

(TORQUE SPLIT) Will illuminate if the difference between engine torques is greater than 10%.

12.2.2.3.2 Compressor Stall
*1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
*2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) — IDLE.
If TGT decreases and stall clears:
3. PCL — Slowly advance to FLY.
If stall remains cleared:
4. Land as soon as practicable. Avoid rapid collective movement.
If TGT continues to rise, Ng decreases below normal idle speed, or any other malfunction is indicated:
5. Engine Shutdown in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.

CAUSE/REMARKS
CAUTION: If the Ng decay relight feature attempts to relight the engine, subsequent compressor stalls may occur and damage the engine. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights. The engine must be manually shutdown.

12.2.3 Engine High−Speed Shaft Failure
*1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
*2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) — OFF.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
Consideration should be given to performing the following:
4. Engine Shutdown in Flight emergency procedure.
5. Single−Engine Landing emergency procedure.

CAUTION: Following a high-speed shaft failure, the engine will overspeed, the Np overspeed system will flame out the engine, and the autoignition system will activate the relight feature. The engine Np governor will eventually bring Np down toward 100%. The engine must be manually shut down to prevent further damage.

CAUSE/REMARKS
(#1/2DRIVESHAFT FAIL)Indicates failure of the high−speed shaft. Np is greater than Nr by more than 3 percent and engine torque is below 10 percent.

Note
The Engine Np Sensor is unreliable with Np < 20%. For this reason any DRVSHAFT FAIL (#1/#2) should be acknowledged and ignored when Engine Np <20%. No maintenance action is required when in this condition.

12.2.5 Abort Start
To abort start:
*1. PCL — OFF.
*2. ENGINE IGNITION switch — OFF.
If engine oil pressure is indicated:
*3. Starter — Engage.
4. Starter — Disengage after 30 seconds and TGT below 540 degrees C.

CAUSE/REMARKS
Abort engine start if any of the following limits is exceeded:
1. Ng does not reach 14 percent within 6 seconds after starter initiation.
2. No oil pressure within 30 seconds after starter initiation (do not motor engine).
3. No light−off within 30 seconds after moving PCL to IDLE.
4. ENGINE STARTER advisory disappears before reaching 52 percent Ng.
5. TGT reaches 851 degrees C before idle is attained.

CAUTION: For aborted starts, fuel flow must be stopped immediately (PCL — OFF) to prevent engine overtemperature.

12.2.6.2 Engine Malfunction During Hover/Takeoff
*1. Control Nr.
*2. CONTGCY PWR switch — ON.
If a suitable landing site exists or unable to transition to forward flight:
*3. Set level attitude, eliminate drift, cushion landing.
If able to transition to forward flight:
*4. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.

12.2.7 Dual−Engine Failure
*1. Autorotation – Establish
*2. Immediate landing/ditching emergency procedures — Perform.
If time and altitude permit:
*3. Engine Air Restart emergency procedures — Perform.

12.2.9 Single−Engine Failure in Flight
*1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
2. Land as soon as practicable.
Consideration should be given to performing the following:
3. Engine Shutdown in Flight emergency procedure.
4. Engine Air Restart emergency procedure.
5. Single−Engine Landing emergency procedure.

CAUSE/REMARKS
Warning light is activated by the vertical instrument when Ng decreases below 55 percent. In the event of an isolated Ng signal failure, the ENG OUT light will be illuminated with the engine operating normally.

12.2.11 Engine Air Restart
*1. APU Emergency Start procedure — As required.
*2. ENGINE IGNITION switch — NORM.
*3. Fuel selector lever(s) — DIR or XFD.
*4. PCL(s) — OFF.
*5. Starter(s) — ENGAGE, motor engine.
*6. PCL(s) — IDLE (TGT 80 C or less, if time permits).
*7. PCL(s) — Advance to FLY after starter dropout.

WARNING: If APU is unavailable, and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions, level flight may not be possible. Ensure AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch is in ENGINE for crossbleed starts.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING: Engine failure accompanied by an explosion or unusual noise indicates damage to the engine. There is a possibility that any attempt to restart the engine may result in a fire. Under such circumstances, do not try to restart the engine unless it is needed to maintain level flight.
CAUTION: For a crossbleed start, use the maximum Ng safely obtainable on the donor engine. Ng less than 94 percent may result in hot starts.
NOTE: Either a single− or dual−engine restart may be attempted following dual− engine failure. Decision should be based on applicability of respective start envelopes and considerations of longer time to idle when executing a dual−engine restart.

12.2.13.1 Engine Anti−Ice/Start Bleed Valve Malfunction Symptoms
1. Constant illumination of the ENG ANTI−ICE ON advisory light above approximately 90 percent Ng or above, 94 percent Ng if OAT is 15 degrees C or greater.
2. No illumination of the ENG ANTI−ICE ON advisory light when Ng drops below approximately 88 percent (Ng may vary on a sliding scale depending on OAT).
3. No illumination of the ENG ANTI−ICE ON advisory light with ENG ANTI−ICE selected ON.
4. No rise in TGT when the ENG ANTI−ICE switch is selected ON.

12.3.1 APU Emergency Start
*1. ECS — OFF.
*2. AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch — APU.
*3. FUEL PUMP switch — APU BOOST.
*4. APU CONTROL switch — ON.
*5. APU GENERATOR switch — ON.

12.4.1.4 Unusual Vibrations on Deck
*1. Collective — Lower.
*2. PCLs — OFF.
*3. Rotor brake — Apply as required.

CAUSE/REMARKS
CAUTION: Application of the rotor brake may aggravate lead/lag tendencies and cause a mechanical failure.

12.4.2 Hung Droop Stop(s)
*1. Reengage rotor to greater than 75 percent Nr.
2. Slightly displace cyclic in an attempt to dislodge the jammed droop stop.
If, after several attempts, the droop stop(s) do not engage:
3. Cyclic — Neutral.
4. Shut down engine(s).
If conditions permit:
5. Do not apply rotor brake.

12.4.3.1 LOW ROTOR RPM
*1. Control Nr.
2. Determine cause of low Nr condition.

CAUSE/REMARK
Warning light is activated by the vertical instrument when Nr is less than 96%

12.5.1 Main Transmission Malfunction
MAIN XMSN OIL TEMP
OR
MAIN XMSN OIL PRESS
OR
ACCESS LH CHIP
OR
ACCESS RH CHIP
OR
CHIP MAIN MDL SUMP
If failure is imminent:
*1. Land immediately.
If secondary indications are present:
*2. Land as soon as possible.
3. APU Emergency Start procedure — Perform.
4. NO. 1 and NO. 2 GENERATOR switches — OFF, as required.
If no secondary indications are present:
5. Land as soon as practicable.

WARNING: Possible indications of main transmission imminent failure may include: yaw attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.
– Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in failure of the tail rotor drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of tail rotor drive.

NOTE: Consideration should be given to performing the applicable steps of the immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure and transiting at a minimum power airspeed and low altitude flight profile (approximately 80 feet and 80 KIAS) to permit a quick flare followed by an immediate landing/ditching.
– A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and temperature sensor (caution light).

CAUSE/REMARKS
Loss of cooling oil supply will lead to electrical and/or mechanical failure of the main generators. If oil pressure decays slowly, the generators may fail before the MAIN XMSN OIL PRESS or MAIN XMSN OIL TEMP caution light illuminates.

12.5.2 INPUT Module CHIP Caution Lights On
INPUT LH CHIP
OR
INPUT RH CHIP
*1. Main Transmission Malfunction emergency procedure — Perform.
If engine secondary indications are present:
2. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
3. PCL (engine with affected input module) — IDLE.

CAUSE/REMARKS
NOTE: Consideration should be given to returning the engine to FLY for landing.

12.5.3 Tail/Intermediate Transmission Malfunction
INT XMSN OIL TEMP
OR
TAIL XMSN OIL TEMP
OR
CHIP INT XMSN
OR
CHIP TAIL XMSN
If failure is imminent:
*1. Land immediately.
If failure is not imminent:
*2. Land as soon as possible.

WARNING:
-High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate ultimate drive failure.
-Consideration should be given to transiting at an altitude sufficient to enter an autorotation and performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.

12.6.1.1 Loss of Tail Rotor Drive Altitude and Airspeed Sufficient to Establish Autorotation
*1. PAC call — AUTO, AUTO, AUTO.
*2. Autorotation — Establish. Center tail rotor pedals.
*3. Drive failure — Attempt to verify.
*4. Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure — Perform.
*5. PCLs — OFF when directed (prior to the flare).

CAUSE/REMARKS
Loss of tail rotor drive may be the result of a loss of tail rotor rotation or tail pylon separation with a possible right rotation. Attempt to verify rotation as a result of drive failure rather than flight control jam or yaw boost hardover.
WARNING: Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective trim release button is not depressed, the DAFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude through the collective trim servo. AFCS−commanded collective movement can result in an accelerated yaw rate.

12.6.1.2 Loss of Tail Rotor Drive Altitude and Airspeed Not Sufficient to Establish Autorotation
*1. PAC call — HOVER, HOVER, HOVER.
*2. Collective — Lower.
*3. PNAC — Hand on PCLs.
*4. PCLs — OFF when directed (approximately 20 to 30 feet).

CAUSE/REMARKS
CAUTION: Altitude may have to be adjusted based on rate of yaw and/or turn.

12.6.2.7 Loss of Tail Rotor Control
*1. Collective/airspeed — Adjust as required to control yaw.
2. If hydraulic malfunction is evident:
a. TAIL SERVO switch — BKUP.
b. BACKUP HYD PMP switch — Check ON.
If backup pump fails to operate:
3. BACKUP HYD PMP Fails to Operate EP – Perform.
4. External cargo/stores/fuel — Jettison/dump, as required.
5. Land as soon as practicable.
6. APU Emergency Start procedure — Perform prior to landing.
7. PCLs — As required.

WARNING: If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the tail rotor servo from NORM to BACK UP may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls.

CAUSE/REMARKS
CAUTION: If the helicopter is shut down and/or hydraulic power is removed with one tail rotor cable failure, disconnect of the other tail rotor cable will occur when force from the boost servo cannot react against control cable quadrant spring tension. The quadrant spring will displace the cable and servo piston enough to unlatch the quadrant cable.

12.7.1.1 Hydraulic System Warning
1. Land immediately.

CAUSE/REMARKS
The HYD warning will occur as a result of several compounded hydraulic malfunctions. The order in which the hydraulic emergency will present itself should allow the pilot early indications of the impending failure.

12.7.1.1 #1 and #2 HYD PUMP Failure
*1. Restrict flight control movement.
*2 Land as soon as possible.

12.7.2.2 #1 Primary Servo or #1 Transfer Module Leak
CAUTION LIGHTS:
#1 RSVR LOW
#1 HYD PUMP
BACK-UP PUMP ON
*1. SERVO switch — 1ST OFF.
*2. Land as soon as practicable.
If the BACKUP RSVR LOW caution also appears or the backup pump fails:
*3. Land as soon as possible.
If the #2 PRI SERVO caution and or HYD WARNING appears:
*4. Land immediately.

NOTE: Be prepared for loss of tail rotor control.
CAUTION: Switching the BACK UP HYD PMP to OFF with weight on wheels and #1 HYD PUMP caution light illuminated will result in loss of tail rotor directional control when the backup pump secures.

12.7.3.2 #2 Primary Servo or #2 Transfer Module Leak
CAUTION LIGHTS:
#2 RSVR LOW
#2 HYD PUMP
BACK-UP PUMP ON
*1. SERVO switch — 2ND OFF.
*2. Land as soon as practicable.
If the BACKUP RSVR LOW caution also appears or backup pump fails:
*3. Land as soon as possible.
If the #1 PRI SERVO caution and/or HYD WARNING appears:
*4. Land immediately.
NOTE: Be prepared for a loss of the pilot−assist servos.

12.7.5 Boost Servo Hardover
*1. SAS/BOOST pushbutton — OFF.
2. Minimize flight control movements.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
4. Make a shallow approach to a hover, maximum 15 knots crosswind. Taxi no more than necessary.

CAUSE/REMARKS
A failure of the collective or yaw boost servo may result in high cockpit control forces. The control loads resulting from a hardover condition can be immediately eliminated by shutting off the boost servos. Resulting cockpit control loads will then be the same as for in-flight boost servos off. The control free play noted will be about 1/2 inch.

12.7.7 Utility Pump Caution Light
*1. Stop dome.

2. UTILITY HYD PUMP switch – OFF.

3. Raise/seat dome using AUX ELEC raise.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

CAUSE/REMARKS

CAUTION:Utility hydraulic pump with low or no hydraulic fluid shall be secured to prevent damage to the pump.

12.8.2.2.1 Flashing AFCS DEGRADED Caution Light On
*1. Safe altitude and airspeed ó Establish (waveoff/Instrument Takeoff [ITO], as required).

2. AFCS CONTROL panel – Check status (BARALT/RADALT HOLD).

3. AFCS CONTROL panel AKNL ADVSY pushbutton – Press.

4. FAIL ADVISORY MODE RESET pushbutton – Press.

If malfunction is not eliminated:

5. CMPTR PWR/RESET pushbutton – Cycle.

If malfunction is still not eliminated:

6. Malfunctioning system – Off (if possible).

CAUSE/REMARKS
Failure of one or more modes of the AFCC. Pilot action is dependent on associated fail advisory lights and system performance. The AFCS Coupler-Related Failures table (Figure 2-52) describes coupler malfunctions.

NOTE
If the AFCS DEGRADED caution appears during a night/IMC coupled hover or automatic approach, consideration may be given to continuing hover/approach if not disoriented or unstable.

12.8.3.1 Stabilator Auto Mode Failure
*1. PAC call — STAB, STAB, STAB.
*2. Cyclic — Arrest pitch rate.
*3. Collective — Do not reduce.
*4. MAN SLEW switch — Adjust to 0.
When at a safe altitude and airspeed:
5. Stabilator circuit breakers — Reset, as required.
6. STABILATOR AUTO CONTROL pushbutton switch – Press once, as required.
If automatic control is not regained and manual mode is operable:
7. MAN SLEW switch – adjust as required. Do not exceed stabilator versus airspeed limits shown below.
If automatic control is not regained and manual mode is not operable:
8. Fly at or below speed shown: (See Stab vs Airspeed limits)
9. Land as soon as practicable.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING:It is possible for the stabilator to fail without illumination of the stabilator caution light
and associated aural warning tone. In this case, the first indication of failure will be an un-commanded pitch change.
-Reengagement of the automatic mode after a
shutdown results in the automatic mode operating for one second. If a hard over signal to one actuator was the cause of the initial shutdown, and reengagement is attempted, the actuator will move before another disengagement is commanded. In this case subsequent reengagement shall not be attempted since it may result in additional stabilator movement. If acceleration is
continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost. The stabilator shall be slewed to 0° as airspeed increases above 40KIAS.
-With large fixed stabilator angles, reduction in collective pitch results in increased aft cyclic requirements. Collective reduction during recovery from a trailing edge down stabilator flight condition should be minimal. If the stabilator becomes fixed at or near 0°, nose high attitudes may occur at slow speeds.
-A combination of hight airspeed/low altitude coupled with a runaway down stabilator (indicated by a significant uncommanded nose down pitch change) will necessitate
immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage the automatic mode by activating manual mode slewing as required.
– At high airspeeds, immediate recognition and flight control input are essential to avoid an
unrecoverable attitude. It is essential for the PNAC to slew the stabilator to 0° immediately to gain control of the aircraft. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.
– Without stabilator auto mode, careful aircrew coordination to manually slew the stabilator is required to avoid undesirable and potentially dangerous flight regimes and/or aircraft attitudes.

NOTE: Autopilot functions (coupled hover, automatic depart, altitude hold) and autorotations require either a functioning stabilator auto mode or manual stab operation. Consideration should be given to securing RADALT hold and avoiding coupled operations to the maximum extent practicable while operating in manual mode.

12.8.4 Unusual Attitude Recovery
*1. Level wings.
*2. Nose on horizon.
*3. Center ball.
*4. Stop rate of climb/descent.
*5. Control airspeed.

CAUSE/REMARKS
Unusual attitudes are considered to be attitudes of over 30 degree pitch and/or 60 degree bank. There are three general unusual attitudes: nose-low, nose-high, and high-bank angles. During all unusual attitude recoveries, the nose-low attitude is the desired condition from which to complete all recoveries.

12.9.1 Total Ac Power Failure/Dual Generator Failure
CAUTION LIGHTS:
#1 CONV
#2 CONV
AC ESS BUS OFF
AFCS DEGRADED
STABILATOR
*1. Safe altitude and airspeed — Establish.
*2. Stabilator — Check position, SLEW as required.
*3. APU Emergency Start Procedure — Perform.
4. CMPTR PWR, SAS 1, SAS 2, TRIM, AUTO PLT, STABILATOR AUTO CONTROL-ON
If ac electrical failure:
(REFER TO PCL)

WARNING: Ensure airspeed vs. stabilator angle limits are not exceeded. Stabilator automatic mode is inoperative.

NOTE:
The stabilator position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the ac Essential bus. Attempt to check visually

CAUSE/REMARKS
Battery life may be no more than 14 minutes; therefore, the electrical equipment remaining on should be only that required for prevailing conditions (e.g., night, IMC).
Note:
The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the dc Essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35deg if full down or 30deg full up when a power failure occurs.
Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of ENGINE ANTI-ICE or DEICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced as much as 49%.

12.11.1.1 #1 or #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS or #1 or #2 FUEL PRESS Caution Lights
CAUTION LIGHTS:
#1 OR #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS
OR
#1 OR #2 FUEL PRESS
*1. Fuel selector lever (affected engine) — XFD (DIR if currently in XFD).
2. Land as soon as practicable.
If affected engine indications are abnormal:
3. Engine Malfunction in Flight procedure — Perform.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING: Low fuel pressure from the respective engine-driven boost pump. Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into
the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout.

12.11.1.2 #1 and #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS or #1 and #2 FUEL PRESS
Caution Lights
#1 AND #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS
OR
#1 AND #2 FUEL PRESS
*1. Land as soon as possible.
*2. APU Emergency Start procedure — Perform.

WARNING:
– Be prepared for dual-engine failure. Recommended airspeed profile is 80 KIAS to minimize Nr droop should dual–engine failure occur.

NOTE: Consideration should be given to performing applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING: Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout.

12.12.1 External Engine Fire
*1. Confirm fire.
*2. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure — Perform.
*3. PCL (affected engine) — OFF.
*4. Engine T−handle (affected engine) — Pull.
*5. FIRE EXT switch— MAIN (RESERVE if required or ac power is off).
If airborne and fire continues:
*6. Land immediately.
If fire appears extinguished:
*7. Land as soon as possible.
8. Single Engine Landing emergency procedure — Perform.
On ground:
9. Fire extinguisher — Discharge into engine compartment.

CAUSE/REMARKS
NOTE: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered though smoke, haze, water, or at sunset or sunrise may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.

12.12.2 Internal Engine Fire
An internal engine fire is indicated by a rise in TGT above 540 degrees C after engine shutdown.
*1. Starter — Engage. Motor engine.
2. Portable fire extinguisher — As required.
3. Starter — Secure (once TGT decreases below 540 _C).

CAUSE/REMARKS
An internal engine fire is indicated by a rise in TGT above 540 C after engine shutdown.

12.12.3 APU Fire
*1. APU T−handle — Pull.
*2. Confirm fire.
*3. FIRE EXT switch — RESERVE (MAIN if required and available).
If airborne and fire continues:
*4. Land immediately.
If fire appears extinguished:
*5. Land as soon as possible.
If on ground:
*6. Fire extinguisher — As required.
7. FUEL PUMP switch — OFF.
8. APU CONTROL switch — OFF.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING: Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ditching is required.

NOTE: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered though smoke, haze, water, or at sunset or sunrise may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.

12.12.4 Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire
If source is known:
*1. Affected power switches and circuit breakers — Secure.
*2. Portable fire extinguisher — As required.
If fire continues or source is unknown:
*3. Cabin/doors/vents/ECS — CLOSE/OFF, as required.
*4. Unnecessary electrical equipment and circuit breakers — Secure.
If fire continues:
*5. Land as soon as possible.
6. Stabilator — Manually slew to zero.
7. NO. 1 and NO. 2. GENERATOR switches — OFF, as required.
8. BATT switch — OFF, as required.
If fire is extinguished:
9. Smoke and Fumes Elimination emergency procedure — Perform.
10. Land as soon as practicable.

NOTE: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of ENGINE ANTI-ICE or DEICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced as much as 49%.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING: Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ditching is required.
– Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practical.
– It may not be advisable to secure all electrical
power, thus losing AFCS, ICS, and flight instruments prior to achieving VMC or landing/ditching.

CAUTION: If source of fire is unknown, consideration should be given to securing Mission Power immediately when securing unnecessary electrical equipment to prevent system damage.

12.12.5 Sonobuoy Lithium Battery Venting
(Lithium battery failure can result in the release of sulfur dioxide gas.)
If the pungent odor and rusty metallic taste characteristic of SO2 fumes are detected, execute the following procedure:

*1. Alert crew
*2. Sonobuoys — Jettison.
*3. Smoke and Fumes Elimination emergency procedure — Perform.

WARNING: Portable fire extinguishers shall not be used to extinguish burning lithium fires since a violent reaction may occur.

NOTE: If jettison of weapon pylon stores is not desired, sonobuoys must be launched manually.

WARNING: Sulfur dioxide exposure in low concentrations can result in lightheadedness, dizziness, headache, difficulty in breathing, and possible loss of consciousness. An indication of the presence of a venting sonobuoy may be an acidic taste in the mouth or a distinct odor similar to that of an electrical fire.

12.12.6 Smoke and Fumes Elimination
*1. Airspeed — Adjust, as required.
*2. Doors/windows/vents — Open.
*3. Aircraft — Yaw, as required.

12.12.10 Immediate Landing/Ditching (Pilot)
*1. Crew and passengers — Alert.
*2. Shoulder harness — Locked.
*3. External cargo/stores/fuel — Jettison/dump as required.
*4. Searchlight — As required.
*5. MAYDAY/IFF — Transmit/EMER.
In the flare:
*6. Windows — Jettison, as required.
After landing:
*7. PCLs — OFF.
*8. Rotor brake — ON.
*9. Copilot collective — Stow.
*10. Pilot HCU – Stow.
After all violent motion stops:
*11. Egress.

CAUTION: Time permitting, consideration should be given to executing APU Emergency Start procedure to maintain electrical and hydraulic power upon rotor disengagement.
WARNING: – After actuation, the position of the emergency
jettison window lever may cause snagging of
personal survival gear, impeding egress. Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the aft position prior to egress
– Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all
violent motion or inrushing water stops may
result in injury or incapacitation.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING:
– Stores jettisoned at descent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP have not been tested. Aircraft/rotor system impact from jettisoned stores may be possible.

12.12.13 Underwater Egress
*1. Emergency Breathing Device — As required.
*2. Cord(s) — Disconnect.
*3. Door/window — Open/jettison.
*4. Place hand on known reference point.
*5. Harness — Release.
*6. Exit helicopter.
After egress:
*7. Swim clear of helicopter and inflate LPU.

CAUSE/REMARKS
WARNING:
– The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed for egress. Extended handles, windows, and controls will not be located in the same relative position. Keep legs clear from under seat area. Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.
– Do not inflate LPU until outside helicopter.
– Water pressure may prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the cabin fills with water. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry to optimize the ability of the crew to safely egress.
– Failure to disconnect ICS cord can impede egress. Personal gear may snag during egress, notably on collectives, FLIR HCUs, parking brake and RAST release handles, PCLs/Fuel Selector Levers/Fire T–Handles, or extended Emergency Jettison Window handles.
– If entanglement or disorientation delays egress, hold onto a reference point with one hand. Using the other hand, place the Emergency Breathing Device second stage regulator in your mouth, clear water from your mouthpiece, and continue with egress.
– To prevent injury while ascending to the surface and breathing from the Emergency Breathing Device, continually exhale to vent the expanding air from your lungs.

12.14.6 FLIR Uncommanded Lasing
*1. MASTER ARM — Verify SAFE.
*2. LASER Select — Safe.
If lasing continues:
If lasing continues:
*3. FLIR – OFF.
4. FLIR circuit breakers ó Pull.
a. FLIR (MISSION EQUIPMENT RACK, AC
SEC, RW 1, cb 3).
b. FLIR (MISSION EQUIPMENT RACK, NO.
2, DC PRI, RW 4, cb 2).

12.2.3.1 Load Demand System Malfunction Symptoms (On Deck)
PCLs in IDLE- Ng of malfunctioning engine 3 percent to 4 percent higher than other engine.

During rotor engagement – Engine with the failed LDS will indicate a higher torque as PCLs are evenly advanced to FLY. Good engine may not indicate any torque until its PCL is in FLY.

PCLs in FLY, collective full down – Indications may range from matched torque, 100 percent Np/Nr ( no indications of failure) to possible 1 to 2 percent torque split with Nr and both Nps matched 1 to 2 percent above 100 percent.

12.2.3.1 Load Demand System Malfunction Symptoms (In Flight)
Initial collective increase during takeoff – Torque split. Torque of the engine with the failed LDS will be lower than good engine.
Stable hover – Matched torques (no indication of failure)
Collective increases (collective below approximate 75 percent of its full up position) – Torque split. Torque of the engine with the failed LDS will be lower than good engine.
Collective increases (collective above approximate 75 percent of its full up position) – No torque split. Both LDS are at their maximum setting.
Collective decreases (to positions below approximate 75 percent of full up collective) – Torque split. Torque of the engine with the failed LDS will be above the good engine.
Stable flight – Matched torque (no indications of failure)
Autorotation – Rapid Np/Nr rise. Engine with failed LDS may show a residual torque of approximate 12 percent with collective full down.

12.8.1 Coupler Emergencies (During approach)
RAD ALT FAILURE
-Aircraft will continue in a descent all the way to the water (if on or above profile with RDR ALT light off).
-Flashing AFCS caution light and CPLR/ALT FAIL ADVISORY light. APPR disengages.

DOPPLER FAILURE
– Approach will continue using airspeed and altitude. Pilot controls airspeed and wing attitude using beeper trim.
-Flashing AFCS caution light. HVR bars freeze. DOPP flag appears in AI. CPLR FAIL ADVISORY light.

Define Warning
Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that may result in injury or death, if not carefully observed or followed.

Define Caution
Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that may result in damage to equipment, if not carefully observed or followed.

Define Note
Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that must emphasized.

12.18.2.2 Hellfire Missile Hangfire
If rocket motor ignites and aircraft yaws:
*1. Adjust controls as required to maintain straight-and-level flight.

If a new priority Hellfire missile is selected by
the system:

2. Proceed with the AGM-114 Hellfire Missile
Launch Checklist.
If a new priority Hellfire missile is not selected:
3. ACI – SAFE.
4. LAUNCHER RESET – Initiate.
5. MD DIAG – Select.
6. LOB WEAPON – Check for FAIL (yellow F).
If no critical faults:
7. Proceed with the AGM-114 Hellfire Missile
Launch Checklist.
If critical BIT status exists or Hellfire missile
launch portion of the mission is complete:
8. ACI – SAFE.
9. FLIR OPERATION PAGE – Select.
10. HELLFIRE PWR – OFF.

If fuel/time permits:
11. Keep Hellfire missile pointed in safe direction
for 30 minutes.

If shore facility not available:

12. Proceed to aviation ship, if available.
13. Proceed to own ship – Use Offset Approach procedures.

If shipboard recovery with hung ordnance not an option:

14. Execute Select Jettison procedure.

WARNING;
The Hellfire missile thermal battery produces voltage for up to 30 minutes after the Hellfire missile squib is automatically fired during the launch sequence. If continued flight is possible, the aircraft should remain airborne with Hellfire missile pointed in a safe direction for a minimum of 30 minutes to allow the thermal battery to become inert.

CAUSE/REMARKS:
CAUTION: Personnel should not handle hung ordnance for at least 30 minutes after attempted launch.

NOTE:
-Normal rocket motor burn time is less than 3 seconds. A rocket motor failure may cause the motor to slow
burn or smolder and smoke for more than 3 seconds.
-The missile thermal battery does not provide the voltage for the rocket motor fire train. Aircraft power via the Signal Data Converter (AH SDC) is required to fire the rocket motor squibs. If motor squibs have not fired within 1.5 seconds after launch attempt, the missile Safe and Arm Device (SAD) will mechanically return to the safe condition. This will disconnect the firing circuit from the rocket motor squibs.

12.18.4.1 All Stores Jettison
*1. ALL STORE JETT – Press.

CAUSE/REMARKS:
NOTE:In the event of a total electrical failure, all stores jettison is inoperative.
-All stores jettison is not available with Weight on Wheels.
-All stores jettison operates regardless of the status (ARM or SAFE) of the MASTER ARM pushbutton.
-All pylon-loaded weapons will be disarmed before jettison.
-Emergency jettison of auxiliary fuel tanks via the ALL STORE JETT pushbutton is inhibited when less than 40 gallons (approximately 272 pounds) remain in tank.
-Minimum pressure to jettison a full sonobuoy launcher is 1,100 psi. If sonobuoy launcher pressure is less than 1,100 psi, the last sonobuoys in sequence may not jettison, with system securing at 250 psi to ensure safe separation of launched sonobuoys.
-ALL STORE JETT does not jettison CMDS stores. Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS) stores can only be jettisoned by selective jettison.
-All Emergency Jettison Panel functions operate normally when running any SIM mode.

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